Congressional Hearings: Immigration Frames in Expert Testimonies by Woods, Joshua & Arthur, C. Damien, PhD
Marshall University
Marshall Digital Scholar
Political Science Faculty Research Political Science
2017
Congressional Hearings: Immigration Frames in
Expert Testimonies
Joshua Woods
C. Damien Arthur PhD
Marshall University, arthur133@marshall.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://mds.marshall.edu/political_science_faculty
Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Political Theory Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at Marshall Digital Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political
Science Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Marshall Digital Scholar. For more information, please contact zhangj@marshall.edu,
martj@marshall.edu.
Recommended Citation
Woods, Joshua, and C. Damien Arthur. “Congressional Hearings: Immigration Frames in Expert Testimonies.” In Debating
Immigration in the Age of Terrorism, Polarization, and Trump. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017.
97
Chapter 5
Congressional Hearings
Immigration Frames in Expert Testimonies
The public’s interest and attention to any political issue can change quickly as 
new events drive other concerns to the forefront (Downs, 1996; Baumgartner 
& Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1999). All interested parties in politics are beholden 
to a variety of demands on their attention, and the prioritization of public con-
cerns can easily fluctuate (Hunt, 2002; Jones, 1994). For instance, in January 
2014, immigration was a concern for about 3 percent of those polled, a small 
share compared to the 25 percent of respondents who named government dis-
satisfaction as the most important problem (Gallup, 2014). By November of 
the same year, during the midterm election, 17 percent of Americans named 
immigration the most important problem (Gallup, 2014).
At the beginning of 2014, the Obama administration and many Repub-
licans had reached agreement on some elements of immigration reform. In 
fact, the Republican Speaker of the House, John Boehner, and the Republican 
House Majority Leader, Eric Cantor, had been discussing and advancing a 
comprehensive immigration bill to work alongside the Senate bill that had 
been passed earlier (Foley, 2014). The approach to immigration reform had 
been advancing because reform was seen, by both parties, as a mechanism to 
fix the problem of having around 11 million undocumented immigrants in the 
United States. (Foley, 2014). The opportunity for immigration reform had all 
but ended by the end of July, when a perfect storm of events drew the atten-
tion of all interested parties away from “reform” to a new problem, border 
security, one that was defined by the restrictionists—those who defeated Eric 
Cantor in his primary race in May—and most importantly, by the influx of 
tens of thousands of migrant children crossing the border. By the time the 
midterm election had taken place, there were as many as 68,000 new undocu-
mented children in the United States (Park, 2014). 
Woods and Arthur_9781498535212.indb   97 04-08-2017   14:45:24
98 Chapter 5
The Obama administration asked for about $1.2 billion from Congress 
to create detention centers to house the children as they figured out what to 
do with them, not wanting to deport them to countries where they might be 
harmed. This decision triggered much criticism. Many Republicans charged 
that Obama was refusing to enforce the law; the children should be deported. 
President Obama tried to frame this incident as a humanitarian response to 
the migrants, with some limited success. The migrants’ presence, however, 
began to tax the budgets and immigration centers of the states. Moreover, the 
Republican Governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Corbett, and other Republican 
members of the House of Representatives argued that the increase in migrant 
children was more than a humanitarian crisis; it was about national and bor-
der security.
Corbett made dubious claims about the children spreading diseases, such 
as the measles, swine flu, tuberculosis, and Ebola. He argued that their pres-
ence in the United States, and the mechanism by which they entered, was 
a threat to the security of our country, saying our borders must be secured 
(Lazar, 2014). Naturally, as the migrant child population continued to rise, 
the issue of immigration shifted from reform, where Obama and the Repub-
lican leadership wanted it, to border security. Therefore, border security and 
its connection to immigration policy was front and center in the midterm elec-
tion, again. And it eliminated any opportunity for policy change. 
Such political turbulence complicates policy efforts of decision makers 
to control or frame an issue such as immigration (Egan, 2013). The unpre-
dictability of events, how those events are framed, and the attention paid 
to the events, present constraints that limit change. Most pertinent issues 
are plagued by this reality. Immigration in particular is an intricate policy 
domain, wherein multiple contextual factors, new information and events, as 
well as competing voices, play a role in shaping issue ownership and policy 
outcomes.
This chapter seeks to ascertain how, given the multiple influences, mem-
bers of Congress and immigration experts frame immigration. Building on 
previous chapters, we assume that the post-9/11 authoritarian turn in immi-
gration rhetoric will also be found in the rhetoric of congressional elites 
during hearings. We assess how 9/11 functions as a shock to the immigra-
tion policy monopoly, wherein the framing nexus of “terrorist” and “border 
control” gains a foothold. In building a substantial database on the discussion 
of immigration, this study coded remarks from the expert testimonies in con-
gressional hearings from the 103rd Congress (1993–1994) through the 109th 
Congress (2005), mapping the framing of immigration rhetoric before and 
after 9/11. Rather than determining if congressional attention to immigration 
is capable of effecting change in the policy narrative, as an entrepreneurial 
mechanism of power, this study provides a discussion on the importance of 
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“triggering events” such as 9/11 and the issue expansion in topical policies 
such as immigration.
9/11 AND THE AUTHORITARIAN TURN 
IN IMMIGRATION POLICY
The United States Senate held a congressional hearing on April 4, 2001, 
entitled Immigration Policy: An Overview, wherein the Immigration Sub-
committee sought to define immigration policy. This was the last hearing on 
immigration the Senate had prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001. The language used in that hearing was not completely positive, but 
there were only 11 negative frames out of a total of 280 mentions of immigra-
tion. Most of the negativity in the expert testimony focused on the economic 
relationships the United States had with other countries and the immigrants 
that migrated here for jobs. Seven of the 11 negative frames addressed the 
economic threat that immigrants can pose to U.S. workers. Nevertheless, the 
hearing was overwhelmingly positive in its assessment of U.S. immigration 
policy and immigrants migrating to the United States. The chairman of the 
subcommittee, Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), began the hearing and set 
the tone with this opening statement:
America is a nation of immigrants. That is what Ronald Reagan reminded us 
of in his first address to the nation. President Reagan saw a vision and always 
envisioned America as a shining city on a hill, and in his mind it was a city that 
teemed with people of all kinds living in peace and in harmony. Then he said, 
“And if this city has walls, the walls have doors, and the doors are open to those 
with the energy and the will and the heart to get in. That is the way I saw it, 
that is the way I see it.” And that is the way I see it, too … America’s greatest 
strength remains in its openness to new ideas and new people. That openness 
explains why the United States is powerful, influential, and growing. (Sam 
Brownback, April 4, 2001) 
The context of this hearing is defined by several factors. It happened before 
9/11, Republicans were in control of the Senate, the president was a Repub-
lican, overall polarization was on the decline, and the United States had just 
entered a recession in April 2001, per the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), which likely explains the hearing’s emphasis on the sup-
posed economic threat of immigration.
In the first congressional hearing on immigration after 9/11, the Effective 
Immigration Controls to Deter Terrorism, both the context of the discussion 
and the framing of immigration changed dramatically. The United States 
suffered the most catastrophic attack on its homeland since Pearl Harbor in 
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December 1941. The Democrats were in control of the Senate (until Novem-
ber 25, 2002). Members of the U.S. Senate, particularly Majority Leader Tom 
Daschle (D-SD), were sent Anthrax, a deadly bacterium, through the U.S. 
Mail. The major corporate scandal involving Enron was unfolding. The Stock 
Market was in a serious downward spiral; the Dow Jones lost 14 percent and 
the S&P was down nearly 12 percent a week after 9/11 (Davis, 2011). And, 
the war in Afghanistan began with strong support from both parties. 
In this first hearing after 9/11, the attempt to expand the immigration 
policy narrative from issues of “illegality” and “criminality” and “economic 
threats” to include “border security” and “terrorism” begins. Illustrating the 
changing tone and context of the immigration policy discussion, Chairman of 
the Subcommittee Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) begins the hearing with his 
opening statement, wherein we see the beginning of the competition for party 
ownership of the issue definition of immigration (Egan, 2013). He states, 
We know that there has been some news affecting exposures to anthrax to some 
of the staff in our buildings and that is being dealt with very effectively by the 
Sergeant at Arms and by the health professionals that have been assigned to deal 
with that job. We feel strongly, since immigration issues have important impli-
cations in terms of national security and also to terrorism, that it was important 
that we move ahead.1 
We are dealing as well with the challenges of immigration as well as the chal-
lenges in the intelligence community. So all of these make up very important 
aspects in dealing with terrorism. It was our judgment that we ought to move 
ahead with this hearing. 
It is a privilege to chair this hearing today on the critical issue of border 
security and its critical importance in preventing terrorism. Strengthening the 
security of our borders is an indispensable part of this Nation’s effort to prevent 
future terrorist attacks. We must develop policies and enact laws that meet the 
serious security threats we face from abroad. (Ted Kennedy, October 17, 2001)
The first congressional hearing after 9/11 clearly showed how Congress was 
redefining immigration policy, expanding the issue to include border security 
and terrorism. The attempt to expand immigration policy continued into the 
next subcommittee hearing on April 12, 2002, The Enhanced Border Security 
and Visa Entry Reform Act. The testimony from Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) is 
indicative of the strategy to control the conflict over immigration policy and 
ascribe policy control and an ownership to the beneficial outcomes of the new 
policy to a specific party (McCool, 1998). In other words, by framing immi-
gration policy as a border security issue that mitigates the threat of terrorism, 
which is popular with the public, all benefits that result will be associated 
with the Democratic or Republican Party, allowing the party to “own” the 
issue of immigration and signal to the voters that the outcome of the popular 
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policy perspective is the result of the actions of the party in control of the 
policy issue. First, however, a bit of context would create a better understand-
ing of the testimony and the interaction between the parties that transpires 
after Senator Byrd’s prepared statement, and their attempt to define, control, 
and own immigration policy. 
Again, this hearing occurs during the short period wherein the Democrats 
have control of the Senate (June 6, 2001 to November 25, 2002) and the 
chairmanships, which enables them to decide what individuals, groups, and 
interests can testify to the subcommittee; therefore, shaping the immigration 
narrative and defining the immigration policy image in the hearing. It is also 
important to note that this hearing is, in part, the result of Senator Byrd’s 
decision not to grant unanimous consent, the previous December, to the pas-
sage of The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, which 
they were discussing in April.
Senator Byrd objected to the request for unanimous consent to pass the bill 
without any hearings or debate on the Senate floor. With total control of each 
branch of government, as well as a major national tragedy and terrorist act, 
the Republicans could move the legislation forward and control the immigra-
tion policy image, while excluding the perspective of the Democratic Party. 
Without an opportunity for the Democratic Party to debate, amend, and force 
Republicans to compromise on the details of the bill, the public would simply 
perceive the border security and terrorist mitigation efforts as the work of the 
Republican Party.
Senator Byrd’s decision was, in part, based on his intention to frame 
immigration policy and its connection to border security in a manner that 
is also beneficial to Democrats, while highlighting the deficiencies of the 
Republican Party’s ideological commitments to border security and terrorist 
mitigation, as it is being discussed in the hearing. It is an ideological fight by 
the parties for immigration policy control. Each party wants ownership over 
border security and its new connection to immigration policy. It is a popular 
policy, and one that involves governmental action that produces money for 
certain districts. It also represents a successful talking point that exemplifies 
the effectiveness of the party. To illustrate our argument, Byrd maintains, 
The September 11 attacks showcased the gaps in our border defenses. … I 
firmly believe that the Senate needs to pass legislation to tighten our immigra-
tion and border security laws. I devoted a large amount of my time and resources 
last fall to that very goal. I crafted a $15 billion homeland defense package as 
part of the economic stimulus bill the Senate considered last November. That 
homeland defense package provided $1.1 billion for border security initiatives, 
many of which are included in the border security bill that we are discussing 
today. Under a Presidential veto threat—let me underline that, under a veto 
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threat by President Bush [a Republican], those funds were removed from the 
economic stimulus package by a partisan vote on a budgetary point of order, and 
every Republican on this committee supported that point of order to knock out 
that money. Not a single Republican stood with us [Democrats] in my effort to 
fund border security then and there, not one. … Because that point of order—we 
were not able to get the 60 votes to override it because the Republicans, to the 
man and woman, voted against it. We could have done things then. But every 
Republican on this committee voted against us [Democrats]. (Robert C. Byrd, 
April 12, 2002) 
Senator Byrd continues this line of thought, framing the issue of border secu-
rity and the failings of the United States in maintaining safe, secure borders 
on the political obstructionism of the Republican Party. He develops the 
notion that the Democrats are willing now, and have been willing in the past, 
to devote political capital, political will, and substantial amounts of money 
to the issue of border security—arguing that the Republicans want to vote in 
the affirmative for border security without voting for the money necessary to 
secure the borders. He states, emphatically, that Republicans have not been 
willing to do this, arguing that not one Republican voted for the money and 
the Republican President Bush threatened to veto the bill. In other words, 
they are not the party of border security, but rather the Democrats are the 
owners of the border security issue in immigration policy. His fear is that the 
Republicans would pass the bill and go home to their states and claim that 
they “fixed” the problem, which makes them the party of border security. 
Senator Byrd continues,
When I tried to get money before we went out of session, not a single Republican 
on this committee supported me, not one. At the time, I was told that a window 
of opportunity had opened to pass this legislation and that in the aftermath of 
the September 11 attacks, a united coalition, Democrats and Republicans, would 
support this authorization bill. Yes, they [Republicans] were willing to support 
the authorization bill, good to pass that, pass it by unanimous consent, go back 
home and say we have taken care of the problem, we passed an authorization 
bill. But not one, not one Republican—I am sorry to have to be so strong in my 
statement here in this regard. I very seldom criticize members of the other party, 
but I think I have a right to in this instance. … And then some of the members 
of this committee implored me, pleaded with me to agree to unanimous consent 
to pass this authorization bill. They could go home then [with complete unified 
party government]. They could say, oh, yes, we passed that. But when it comes 
to the money, I wanted to face these Republicans and say, are you going to vote 
for the money [the real measures necessary to fix the border security problem]? 
(Robert C. Byrd, April 12, 2002)
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The contrast between the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 hearings is indicative of 
the fundamental argument in this book, namely, an act of extreme terrorism 
helped to redefine and expand, by adding a new framework, the authoritarian 
approach to immigration policy in American political affairs. The 9/11 attack 
refocused the attention of government on immigration, expanding the policy 
image to include the issue of border security, along with illegality, criminal-
ity, and economic threats. The United States went from spending $1.055 bil-
lion in 2000 to $3.531 billion in 2012, which is about a 235 percent increase 
in funding in just over a decade (Graham 2013).
However, this immigration policy issue expansion does not replace the 
dominant “illegal” framing nexus, but rather offers terrorism and border 
security a place in the rhetorical palette of elite authoritarian discourse in con-
gressional hearings. The effects of 9/11 and the immigration issue expansion 
set off a competition between the Republican and Democratic parties to own 
the issue of immigration and its connections to border security and terrorist 
mitigation. Moreover, the ownership of the post-9/11 immigration policy also 
gave the party the reputation of being the protector of national security in the 
face of terrorism and immigration dangers, a strategic electoral advantage. 
Republicans eventually ended up “owning” the issue, but the Democrats were 
fighting for ownership directly after 9/11, as illustrated above. In fact, as Egan 
(2013) notes, the issue of immigration was the second most important policy 
priority the public had for both the president and the Congress in 2008 and 
the most important one by 2011.
It is important to note here that the congressional committees established 
by members of congress create policy monopolies through their stronghold 
on the policy turfs; the committees are a subsystem of limited participation 
(Worsham, 2006). Only those persons invited by the majority party can 
participate in the hearings. The control of the policy turf can create policy 
monopolies, wherein the image of the policy is completely controlled by 
a limited group of participants and access to that policy-making system of 
power is restricted by those in control, elected officials in this case (Wor-
sham, 2006).
The interesting aspect of this shift in the immigration issue definition, how-
ever, is that there is very little resistance to including “terrorism” and “border 
security” in the immigration conversation, but rather the competition is more 
closely identified with party ownership of the idea. This is precisely why 
Democrats, in the limited amount of time they are in control of the Senate 
after 9/11, hold hearings when they know their control is limited in duration. 
In other words, there were no arguments about the overall policy image of 
immigration wherein one would say it is solely about “illegality” or “refu-
gees,” as it had been in the past, but rather it appears that including “border 
security” and “terrorism” as policy images for immigration are a foregone 
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conclusion by many of the voices in the elite discourse on immigration. The 
expansion of the authoritarian turn in the immigration policy image in Con-
gress can be seen in nuanced rhetoric from the elite experts in the hearings. 
These differentiations are more apparent from those that are from border 
states or those states with high immigrant populations and migrant worker 
economies, however. Nevertheless, the reality is that after 9/11 the dominant 
immigration policy monopoly is one of negativity and authoritarianism. 
DATA AND SOURCES
The number of hearings on immigration policy have ranged from nearly 
70 in the 80th Congress (1947–1949) to just above 20 hearings in the 82nd 
Congress (1951–1953). This dramatic rise and fall remains until the 95th 
Congress (1977–1979), wherein it hovers around 75 hearings until it drops 
off to under 10 hearings in the 98th Congress (1981–1983). There has been 
a steadier increase in the number of hearings through the 103rd Congress 
(1993–1995). Compared to the Senate, the House of Representatives has been 
a bit more consistent in the number held, dropping below 65 hearings only 
in the 86th Congress (1959–1961) and the 89th through the 91st Congresses 
(1963–1969). The fluctuation in the number of Senate hearings is indicative 
of the competition in immigration policy; as the majority and minority power 
changes, each group schedules hearings so as to frame the policy discussion 
in ways that benefit their party (Hunt, 2002).
Our study is interested in what was said during these hearings and who said 
it (Hunt, 2002). For this reason, we differentiated congressional testimonies 
by elected officials, government bureaucrats, and interest groups. We choose 
to analyze the hearings from the 104th Congress to the 109th Congress 
(1995–2005), giving us, a few years before 9/11 and a few years after this 
consequential event. As Theriault (2013) argued, this is a period when both 
the Senate and House are polarized. During this period, typically referred to 
as the Republican Revolution, the Republican Party’s Contract with America 
was formalized, uniting the party and polarizing the Senate (Theriault & 
Rohde, 2011). The Republicans took control of both the House and the Sen-
ate during this time, after years of Democratic Party control and polarization 
began to increase.
We choose to ignore the House Hearings for theoretical reasons and took 
a statistically appropriate approach to narrowing down the number of Senate 
hearings (Garand, 2010; Lee, 2008; McTague & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013). 
We would expect intense polarization and competition for control of immi-
gration policy in the House, more so than in the Senate, as other research 
suggests (Theriault & Rohde, 2011; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984; Schickler, 
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2000; Finocchiaro, & Rohde, 2008; Eilperin, 2007). Focusing exclusively on 
hearings in the Senate allows us to make a unique contribution to immigration 
policy analysis. As Theriault and Rohde (2011) maintain, most studies have 
examined the House because the rules of that body encourage polarization 
and those of the Senate foster a more “equalitarian” approach to policy mak-
ing. Yet, because the Senate has become more polarized since the Republican 
Revolution, more studies need to focus on the Senate exclusively to expand 
our institutional understanding of the Senate’s impact on policy, especially 
on a contentious, polarizing issue like immigration. As discussed earlier, we 
expect that House members will be strongly in favor of or against various 
immigration ideologies, as they represent specific, localized economies and 
constituencies; the senators represent a larger, more diverse constituency that 
better reflects the views and attitudes of their entire state. Therefore, a shift 
in the rhetoric of the Senate hearings would be more representative of an 
authoritarian turn on immigration policy in society.
In addition, following a sharp decline, the number of Senate immigration 
hearings increased back to the level of 1985. As Figure 5.1 illustrates, there 
is a drop in hearings in 1999 and 2000, which indicates that the immigration 
policy image is established and not at risk for a challenge from the other party 
(MacLeod, 2002). The fact that there is a dramatic increase in hearings after 
9/11 in 2001 is indicative of the challenge to the established immigration 
policy image and the competition for party ownership of that issue. 
The increase in hearings remains steady until 2006 when the Democrats 
take control of the Senate, leading us to speculate that party and issue owner-
ship has a significant effect here. Not only is each chamber vying for control 
of immigration policy, we can also see an attempt made by the Republican 
Party to elevate this issue at the beginning of their Revolution and maintain 
Figure 5.1 Number of Senate hearings on immigration 1985–2013. Source: The data 
used for this figure are from the Policy Agendas Project data set. It provides a visual, 
detailed picture of the total number of Congressional Hearings in the U.S. Senate dif-
ferentiated by year, which is represented by the X-axis in this figure. The Y-axis shows the 
breakdown of the congressional hearings by the start year of the congressional session. 
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it throughout their time in the majority as they get more seats in the 2002 
midterms, an effect of 9/11 (Hunt, 2002).   
To obtain transcripts of the hearings pertaining to immigration, one can-
not simply use a key word search to identify hearings by topic. The word 
“immigration” is often mentioned in hearings that have nothing to do with 
immigration per se. Therefore, to ascertain the number of hearings that spe-
cifically address immigration we went to the Policy Agendas Project and 
utilized their data, as it is accepted in the scholarly community. As Figure 
5.1 shows, there were 59 hearings in the Senate from 1995 through 2005. 
Our next challenge was to narrow down the number of hearings and select 
a manageable sample (Cook, Barabas & Page, 2002). Our search led us to 
the Library of Congress (LOC), which houses a large collection of congres-
sional hearings digitized in a searchable format. Partnering with Google, 
the LOC has collected every congressional hearing in existence. As part of 
a test experience, the LOC and Google selectively compiled a sample of 
hearings in three areas: Census U.S., Freedom of Information/Privacy, and 
Immigration. Thus, we had each Senate hearing from 1995 through 2005 in 
a searchable document. 
Mentions of “immigration” number in the tens of thousands for all hear-
ings in the Senate, especially when you consider all stem forms of the word 
“immigra.” Trying to ascertain each relevant stem word and code it appro-
priately is unnecessary and burdensome (Woods & Arthur, 2014; Arthur 
& Woods, 2013; Hopkins & King, 2010). To reduce the impracticality of 
analyzing the entire population of congressional mentions of “immigra,” we 
coded every mention of the term “immigration” in our sample of congres-
sional hearings to create a database of elite discourse that extends around 
five years before and after 9/11 (Woods & Arthur, 2014; Arthur & Woods, 
2013; Lohr, 2010; Barrett & Eshbaugh-Soha, 2007; Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; 
Spriggs, 1996; Barrett, 2004; Peterson, 1990). There were 1,989 mentions of 
immigration, our unit of analysis, in the 18 hearings we read and coded (See 
Table 5.1).  
As discussed in previous chapters, the codebook used for this project is 
aimed at detecting the use of four negative immigration frames, including 
illegality, criminality, terrorism, and economic threats (Cameron, 2000; Bar-
rett, 2005; Barrett, 2004; Woods & Arthur, 2014; Arthur & Woods, 2013). 
In addition to coding the negative frames, we coded several social identifiers 
that are often used in the context of the immigration debate, such as the 
country of origin (Mexican/Hispanic, Arab, and so forth). Following previous 
studies, we took the closest coding trigger to the thought regarding “immigra-
tion” (Arthur & Woods, 2013; Arthur, 2014). We are highly confident in the 
reliability of our human coding procedure (for a detailed discussion of the 
inter-coder reliability, see chapter 3).
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EMPIRICAL MODEL
We used a regression analysis to facilitate our understanding of the authori-
tarian shift in elite immigration discourse after 9/11 and help us make sense 
of those changes in relation to this dramatic shock to the political system. 
The model also reveals how and when important social identifiers are used 
by elites in the immigration debate. The analyses provided predicted prob-
abilities and odds ratios for the use of negative frames in our 1,989 units of 
analysis. Table 5.6 presents the coefficients, standard errors, and the measures 
of significance.
Variables
Our exploratory look at the data revealed that the primary participants in 
the process were 1) Senators, the other members of Congress, and other 
various elected officials invited to testify at the hearings; 2) interest groups, 
Table 5.1 Coded Senate Hearings on Immigration 1995–2005
Extracted from the Library of Congress
May 10, 1995 Verification of Applicant Identity for Purposes of 
Employment and Public Assistance
Oct. 2, 1996 Immigration and Naturalization Oversight 
May 1, 1997 INS Oversight: The Criminal Record Verification Process 
for Citizenship Applicants
July 17, 1997 The Visa Waiver Pilot Program 
Dec. 17, 1997 Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act
April 14, 1999 The Kosovo Refugee Crisis
Oct 21, 1999 America’s Workforce Needs in the 21st Century
April 4, 2001 Immigration Policy: An Overview
Oct 17, 2001 Effective Immigration Controls to Deter Terrorism
Feb. 12, 2002 Empty Seats in a Lifeboat: Are There Problems With the 
U.S. Refugee Program?
Feb. 28, 2002 The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act 
April 12, 2002 The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
March 12, 2003 Border Technology: Keeping Terrorists out of the United 
States
July 29, 2003 L1 Visa and American Interests in the 21st Century Global 
Economy
March 23, 2004 United States and Mexico: Immigration Policy and the 
Bilateral Relationship
April 1, 2004 Securing Our Borders Under A Temporary Guest Worker 
Proposal
Sep 21, 2004 Refugees: Seeking a Solution to a Global Concern
April 28, 2005 Strengthening Border Security Between the Ports of Entry: 
The Use of Technology to Protect the Borders
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whose mission is connected and vested in U.S. immigration policies; and 
3) unelected bureaucrats charged with the government operations of the 
immigration apparatus. Each of these experts played an important role in the 
messages presented in the hearings. For this reason, when breaking down the 
mentions of immigration, we differentiated each statement by source (elected 
officials, non-elected bureaucrats, or interest groups) (See Table 5.2).  
The invitation of interest groups and politicians serves more than the need 
for expert information (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Kersh, 2006). The mere 
presence of certain political actors is a powerful symbol that can mobilize 
a specific set of ideas (Chock, 1991; Talbert, Jones, & Baumgartner, 1995; 
Birkland, 1998). Their presence and testimony represents the will of the 
people and offers legitimacy to whatever idea about immigration is presented. 
Moreover, they represent the concerns about and the solutions to the prob-
lems associated with the states the elected officials represent. Theoretically, 
each member of congress is concerned with making good policy and their 
own reelection, which leads them to use the committee system and congres-
sional hearings to garner attention to an issue and define or redefine that issue 
during the hearings (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 1989). 
See Table 5.3 for a list of those “expert” politicians who testified in the time 
of our analysis and Table 5.4 for a list of those interest groups that testified.  
The non-elected bureaucrats are invited to offer their institutional knowl-
edge of immigration. Their presence is required to illustrate the problems 
with the functional mechanics of the governmental immigration apparatus. 
Depending on the policy image desired by the majority party, the non-elected 
bureaucrats are there to offer reassurance that the bureaucracy can handle 
whatever solution or problem the Congress presents to them. Interest groups 
have been an indispensable component of American politics. Their presence 
in congressional hearings grants legitimacy to their cause and the causes of 
those members who invite them to testify. Their testimonies, and any par-
ticular points of information, are important, but also their presence represents 
Table 5.2 Bivariate Relationships between Immigration Frames and Elite Discourse of 
Expert Testimonies in Congressional Hearings
 Bureaucrats n / %
Elected 
Officials n / %
Interest Groups 
n / %
Terrorism 9/2 41/7 34/4
Criminality 12/3 5/1 13/1
Illegality 56/14 92/16 64/7
Economic Threat 13/3 15/2 24/3
No Frames 324/78 432/74 818/85
Total Number of 
Statements from Experts 414/100 585/100 953/100
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Table 5.3 Testimony of Elected Officials and their Immigration Philosophy1
Elected Official Immigration Philosophy Border State
Hispanic 
Population
Benjamin Cayetano 
(Gov. HI) 
Economic Expansion No 7.3%–8.9%
Barbara Boxer 
D-CA
Reformist Yes 25.8%–37.6%
Bob Miller (Gov. 
NV)
Economic Expansion No 10.4%–26.5%
Neil Abercrombie 
(Rep.HI)
Security No 7.3%–8.9%
Charles Grassley 
(R-IA)
Restrictionist/Security No 1.2%–5.0%
Christopher Dodd 
(D-CT)
Security: Border/Economic No 6.5%–13.4%
Chuck Hagel 
(R-NE)
Reformist No 2.3%–9.2%
Larry Craig (R-ID) Restrictionist No 5.3%–11.2%
Daniel Inouye 
(D-HI)
Economic Expansion No 7.3%–8.9%
Dianne Feinstein 
(D-CA)
Illegality Problem Yes 25.8%–37.6%
Frank Murkowski 
(R-AK)
Economic Expansion No (Borders 
Canada)
3.2%–5.5%
Jay Kim (Rep. CA) Economic Expansion Yes 25.8%–37.6%
John Cornyn (R-TX) Restrictionist Yes 25.5%–37.6%
John McCain 
(R-AZ)
Restrictionist Yes 18.8%–29.6%
Jon Corzine (D-NJ) Security No 9.6%–17.7%
Jon Kyl (R-AZ) Security: Border/Economic Yes 18.8%–29.6%
Maria Cantwell 
(D-WA)
Reformist/Refugees No (Borders 
Canada)
4.4%–11.2%
Mazie Hirono (Lt. 
Gov. HI)
Economic Expansion No 7.3%–8.9%
Orrin Hatch (R-UT) Border Security No 4.9%–13.0%
Patrick Leahy 
(D-VT)
Reformist No (Borders 
Canada)
0.7%–1.5%
Bill Clinton 
(D- POTUS)
Refugee Protections (n/a) US 9%–16.3%
Lincoln Diaz-Balart 
(R-Rep. FL) 
Refugee Protections No 12.2%–22.5%
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 
(R-Rep. FL) 
Illegality/Criminality No 12.2%–22.5%
John Conyers, Jr. 
(D-Rep. MI) 
Refugee Protections No (Borders 
Canada)
2.2%–4.4%
Richard Durbin 
(D-IL)
Reformist: Border/Economic 
Sec. 
No 7.9%–15.8%
Richard Lugar 
(R-IN) Security: Border/Economic No 1.8%–6.0%
(Continued)
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Table 5.3 Testimony of Elected Officials and their Immigration Philosophy1 (Continued)
Elected Official Immigration Philosophy Border State
Hispanic 
Population
Spencer Abraham 
(R-MI)
Reformist: Illegality No (Borders 
Canada)
2.2%–4.4%
Alan K. Simpson 
(R -WY)
Reformist: Processes No 5.7%–8.9%
Bob Graham (D-FL) Refugee Protections No 12.2%–22.5%
Charles Robb 
(D-VA)
Reformist/Restrictionist No 2.6%–7.9%
Charles Schumer 
(D-NY)
Refugee Protections No (Borders 
Canada)
12.3%–17.6%
Ted Kennedy 
(D-MA)
Reformist/Security No 4.8%–9.6%
Mike DeWine 
(R-OH)
Restrictionist: Security 
Reformist 
No (Borders 
Canada)
1.3%–3.1%
Robert C. Byrd 
(D-WV)
Border Security No 0.5%–1.2%
Sam Brownback 
(R-KS)
Border Security No 3.8%–10.5%
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 
(R-Rep. FL) 
Refugee Protections No 12.2%–22.5%
Saxby Chambliss 
(R-GA)
Border Security No 1.7%–8.8%
Stephen Horn 
(R-Rep. CA)
Illegality: Government Doc. Yes 25.8%–37.6%
Jeff Sessions (R-AL) Restrictionist No 0.6%–3.9%
Tom Coburn (R-OK) Restrictionist No 2.7%–8.9%
Tony Knowles 
(Gov-AK) Economic Expansion
No (Borders 
Canada) 3.2%–5.5%
* These Immigration philosophy indicators do not perfectly reflect the coding we used for the statistical 
analysis, but rather are qualitative descriptions of the overall theme of their testimonies to the Congress 
in the data set we analyzed. We are aware that these figures can and do change their perspectives of 
immigration over time. Our assessments are for the time frame 1995–2005. For the statistical analysis we 
used an epidemiological approach and only coded negative frames. 
a specific idea of a group or highlights their presence for symbolic reasons 
(Diermeier, & Feddersen, 2000). Moreover, the groups picked are typically 
highly organized and possess access to monies, which facilitates in the 
Senators’ attempt to advance the immigration policy image desired (Leyden, 
1995). See Table 5.5 for a list of those non-elected bureaucrats who testified 
in the time of our analysis. 
In the model, we regressed our dependent variable, whether or not there was 
negative immigration frame, on our key independent variable (before or after 
9/11), giving us a predicted probability of the effect of the 9/11 on the fram-
ing of immigration rhetoric. We also controlled for other variables, including 
the type of immigration expert, the geographical locations of the expert (e.g., 
borders Mexico), and the social identifiers connected to the immigrants or 
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Table 5.4 Interest Groups Testifying in Congressional Hearings, differentiated by Year 
and Lobbying Mission
Interest Group (Yr. Testified) Lobbying Mission
AFL-CIO (1995) Lobbying for Union/Labor
American Occupational Therapy Assoc. (1995) Lobbying for Occupational Therapy
American Business Legal Immigration (1995) Lobbying Group for Immigration
The Technology Network (1995) Lobbying Group for Technology
Western Governors Association (1997) Bipartisan Lobbying Group of 
Govern.
National Council of Agriculture Empl. (1995) Trade Association for Agriculture
American Electronics Association (1995) Trade Assoc. for Technology 
Industry
Private Attorney/Former Senate Council (1995) Technology Frauds in Govern. 
Docs.
CA Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) Frauds in Govern. Docs.
Institute of Electrical & Electronics, INC (1995) Trade Association for Electronics
Olympus Group (1995) Business Lobby Group
Coalition for Fair Empl, Silicon Valley (1995) Trade Assoc. for Employees
DMV, Maryland (1995) Frauds in Govern. Docs.
Mexican Legal Defense & Edu (1995&2004) Legal Information Provider
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (1997) Legal Information Provider
Airports Council International (1997) Trade Association for Airports
Amnesty International (1997) International Civil Rights 
Organization
Governmental Accountability Office (1997) U.S. Government Agency
Honduran Unity (1997) Information Provider
National Governors Association (1997) Network of U.S. Governors
Florida Immigration Advocacy Center (1997) Legal Information Provider
Air Transport Association of America (1997) Trade Association for Air Transport
Archbishop of Miami (1997) Religious Information Provider
Center for Protection of Women, Kosovo (1999) NGO Protecting Refugees
Biometric Industry Association (2001) Trade Association for 
BioTechnology
National Council of La Raza (2001) Civil Rights Organization
American Immigration Lawyers Assoc. (2001) Legal Information Provider
Cato Institute (2001) Think Tank
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers (2001) Legal Information Provider
Nat. AsianPacific Ameri. Legal Consort. (2001) Legal Information Provider
U.S. Conference of Bishops (2002) Religious Information Provider
Fraternal Order of Police (2002) Trade Association for Law 
Enforcement 
Latham and Watkins (2002) Legal Information Provider
American Federation of Gov. Emp. (2002) Federal Employee Union
Chicago Bar Legislative Committee (2002) Legal Information Provider
Unaccompanied Child, Foreign Country (2002) Personal Interest Story
Lawyers Commt. for Civil Rights (2002) Civil Rights Organization
U.S. Committee for Refugees (2002) Resettling Refugees Organization
Families of September 11, 2001 (2002) Nonprofit supporting the deceased 
of 9/11
(Continued)
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immigration mentioned (e.g., Hispanic, Arab). We also included measures of 
congressional control to ascertain how the make-up of government and party 
control shaped immigration rhetoric (namely, we used variables for divided 
government, party control of senate, and an election year variable). 
Statistical Findings
To find the predicted probability of the specific indicators on the presence of 
negative frames in congressional hearings between 1995 and 2005, a Logistic 
Regression Analysis was performed. The model, overall, is in line with our 
theory. The presence of negative immigration frames in congressional hear-
ings increased after 9/11, holding all other variables constant. A one-unit 
change in the period, before/after 9/11, makes a significant difference in the 
frequency of negative immigration frames. The odds of a negative frame 
occurring after 9/11 increases by a factor of 5.438, which is a 443.8 percent 
change in odds. Our research suggests that it is significantly more likely that 
congressional hearings after September 11, 2001, will have a negative immi-
gration frame, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. This finding was highly significant, 
both statistically and in terms of the magnitude of the odds ratio.
In our analysis of the hearings, the dynamics of congressional government 
and its relation to the immigration policy image had a significant impact. It 
Table 5.4 Interest Groups Testifying in Congressional Hearings, differentiated by 
Year and Lobbying Mission (Continued)
Interest Group (Yr. Testified) Lobbying Mission
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2002) Business Lobby Group
American Civil Liberties Union (2002) Civil Rights Organization
Refugee Women and Children (2002) NGO Protecting Refugees
American Council on Intern. Personnel (2003) Employer Network 
Systems Staffing Group (2003) Business Provider
Adjunct Professor of Law, Cornell (2003) Information Provider
Global Personnel Alliance (2003) Forum of Companies Concerned 
about Immigration
The Migration Policy Institute (2004) Think Tank
Federation for Immigration Reform (2004) Nonprofit trying to Reduce Illegal 
Immigration
American Immigration Law Foundation (2004) Public Charity 
Adjunct Professor of Law, Univ. GA (2004) Information Provider
Latin Studies at Georgetown Univ. (2004) Information Provider
Council on Foreign Relations (2004) Think Tank, providing information
Refugee Council USA (2005) NGO Protecting Refugees
Haitian Refugee Homestead, FL (2005) Resettling Refugees 
Pew Hispanic Center (2005) Provides Statistical and Survey 
Information
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Table 5.5 Non-Elected Bureaucrats Testifying in Congressional Hearings and the 
Negative Frames they use in their testimonies, differentiated by Year and Agency 
Bureaucrat (Yr. 
Testified) Immigration Frames Agency
James A. Puelo 
(1995)
Illegality Immigration & Naturalization 
(INS)
Steven L. Pomerantz 
(1995)
Illegality Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (Criminal 
Justice)
Robert H. Rasor 
(1995)
Illegality Secret Service
Jack Scheidegger 
(1995)
No Frames Department of Justice (CA) 
Richard E. Jackson 
(1995)
No Frames Department of Motor 
Vehicles (NY)
William Florence 
(1995)
No Frames Department of Motor 
Vehicles (NY)
Mary Ryan (1997) No Frames State Department
Michael Bromwich 
(1997)
Criminality Department of Justice 
Michael Cronin 
(1997)
Terrorism/Illegality Immigration & Naturalization 
(INS)
Richard Stana (1997) No Frames Government Accountability 
Office (GAO)
Stephan Colgate 
(1997)
No Frames Department of Justice
Julia V. Taft (1999) No Frames State Department
James Ziglar (2001) Criminality Immigration & Naturalization 
(INS)
Lino Gutierrez (2001) Illegality State Department
Michael Creppy 
(2002)
No Frames Executive Office for 
Immigration Review
Stewart Anderson 
(2002)
Illegality Immigration & Naturalization 
(INS)
Asa Hutchinson 
(2003)
Illegality Homeland Security (Border 
Patrol)
Robert C. Bonner 
(2004)
Illegality/Criminality Homeland Security (Border 
Protection)
Roger Noriega (2004) Illegality/Criminality State Department (Western 
Hemisphere)
Arthur Dewey (2004) No Frames State Department (Refugees)
Eduardo Aguirre 
(2004)
Every Frame Homeland Security 
(Immigration)
Stewart Verdery 
(2004)
Every Frame Homeland Security (Border 
Security)
David Aguilar (2005) Illegality/Criminality Homeland Security 
(Immigration)
Dr. Kirk Evans (2005) No Frames Homeland Security
(Continued)
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Table 5.5 Non-Elected Bureaucrats Testifying in Congressional Hearings and the 
Negative Frames they use in their testimonies, differentiated by Year and Agency 
(Continued)
Bureaucrat (Yr. 
Testified) Immigration Frames Agency
Gilbert C. Fisher 
(2005)
No Frames Social Security Administration
Doris Meissner 
(2007)
Illegality/Economic Threat Immigration & Naturalization 
(INS)
Table 5.6 Predicting the Presence of a Negative Immigration Frame in Congressional 
Hearings, 1995–2005
 
Dependent Variable: Pr (Success = 1)
N = 1989
 Log Likelihood      - 763.95766    Wald  χ² = 311.36 (p < .0000)
 Coefficients
Odds 
Ratios
Percent 
Change in 
Odds p value
Robust 
Standard 
Errors
Period 1.693 5.438 443.8% .000 .4821
Border’s Mexico 1.285 3.615 261.5% .000 .3117
Elected Official .8394 2.315 131.5% .059 .4445
Bureaucrat -.9059 .4042 -59.6% .022 .3953
Interest Group -1.338 .2625 -73.8% .000 .3790
Election Year -.4687 .6258 -37.4% .009 .1786
Republican Senate 1.913 6.776 577.6% .000 .5216
Divided 
Government
1.382 3.983 298.3% .000 .3942
Hispanic Identity .3159 1.372 37.1% .243 .2705
Arab Identity 2.135 8.456 745.6% .000 .4016
Asian Identity .8967 2.451 145.1% .172 .6568
Reform Rhetoric 1.306 3.692 269.2% .000 .1519
DC based Speaker 2.502 12.211 1121.1% .000 .2661
Terrorism/HS 
Subcommittee -1.267 .2817 -71.8% .014 .5167
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is one of the most important variables and contributes to the research. Our 
results indicate that the party that is in control of the Congress, as well as 
whether there is a divided government, particularly between congressional 
control and presidential control, has a significant effect on the presence of 
negative immigration frames in the testimonies of expert witnesses. There 
were more negative frames in congressional hearings after 9/11 during 
Republican control of the Senate (246) than in Democratic control of the Sen-
ate (44). Moreover, when Republicans are in control of the Senate, the pres-
ence of a negative frame in the hearing increases by a factor of 6.776, which 
is a 577.6 percent change in odds, as seen in Table 5.6; it is highly significant. 
We maintain that the increase in frames and the inclusion of a new “ter-
rorism” frame is specifically about party control and defining and connect-
ing immigration policy with border security. The authoritarian approach to 
immigration is present in congressional hearings prior to 9/11, but it is signifi-
cantly increased after 9/11. As we discussed earlier, the competition for issue 
ownership of immigration is not about issue redefinition in the classic sense, 
but rather it is about adding a new negative frame to the nexus by which we 
discuss immigration, namely, terrorism and border security. This new frame-
work is advocated by the elected officials, mostly from the Republican Party 
leadership in the Senate and the other elected officials they invite to testify, 
as illustrated in Table 5.3
After 9/11, there is a significant difference in the negativity regard-
ing immigration in the rhetoric of elected officials. In fact, the negativity 
increased by a factor of 2.315. The terrorism and border security frame is not 
coming from the non-elected bureaucrats or the interest groups, as indicated 
by our regressions. Statistically, the non-elected bureaucrats and the inter-
est groups, in their testimony, holding all other variables constant, are more 
negative before 9/11 and when Republicans control the Senate. Democrats 
AQ: Repeti-
tion of text is 
to be avoided. 
The text 
“the party 
that is in 
control of the 
Congress… 
of negative 
immigration 
frames” in the 
sentence “Our 
results indi-
cate that …” 
is a verbatim 
repetition of 
text found in 
chapter 4, two 
paragraphs 
above the 
conclusion. 
Please con-
sider para-
phrasing the 
same.
Figure 5.2 The probability of a negative immigration frame in the expert testimony during a 
congressional hearing, 1995–2005. Source: The data used for this figure are coded by the authors 
from all Senate congressional hearings on immigration from 1995–2005. It provides a visual, 
detailed picture of the probability of a negative immigration frame existing before and after 9/11. 
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use this negative frame after 9/11, and invite experts who use it, when they 
are in control of the Senate, but it is not statistically significant. It is, how-
ever, highly significant when Republicans use it when they are in control and 
determine which experts testify. 
These two “expert witness” groups continue to offer a negative policy 
image of immigration after 9/11, wherein the non-elected bureaucrats 
employed 56 negative frames and the interest groups used 115 negative 
immigration frames after 9/11, both of which are an increase in the number 
frames after 9/11. Moreover, we know that the groups were utilized by the 
Senate and the Republican leadership to employ the illegality, economic 
threat, and criminality frames prior to 9/11. We maintain that the Republican 
leadership allowed these groups to testify as a mechanism of maintaining 
the current immigration policy image, one of negativity, as they did prior to 
9/11. As discussed earlier, there is no attempt to replace the existing negative 
frames of illegality, criminality, and economic threats after 9/11, but rather an 
attempt to continue those discussions in order to place the new framework of 
terrorism and border security alongside them, creating a larger authoritarian 
framing nexus.2
Our results also suggest that it is more likely that the geographical location/
state matters in the frequency of negative immigration frames. If the expert 
testifying is from a state that borders Mexico, they will use more negative 
frames than if they are from a state that does not. In other words, for every 
one-unit change the odds of it being negative toward immigrants increase by 
a factor of 3.615, which is a 261.5 percent change in the odds. As would be 
expected, expanding immigration policy to include border security engenders 
a greater concern for people in states that border Mexico, which is probably 
why they were invited to testify. 
Moreover, we were curious if the social identification of the immigrant 
mentioned made any difference in the likelihood that a negative frame would 
be used. Our analysis found that the results are mixed in the congressional 
hearings. Overall, however, we find that the expert witness testimony is less 
likely to include specific social identifiers with specific negative immigration 
frames; this is a different result from the chapter on presidential rhetoric. The 
social identification of “Arab” does make a significant difference in the fre-
quency of negative immigration frames used in congressional hearings. There 
is a dramatic increase in the use of the Arab social identifier when discuss-
ing immigration after 9/11. As expected, this social identifier was not used 
at all prior to 9/11 and was used forty-five times afterward. Overall, when 
those testifying mention Arab immigrants or immigration, the presence of a 
negative frame attached to it increased by a factor of 8.456, which is a 745.6 
percent change in odds. 
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It is interesting to note, however, that the Mexico, Central America, Carib-
bean, South America (also Latino or Hispanic) frame was not statistically 
significant in the model. Use of this social identifier did increase by 207 per-
cent after 9/11 but these mentions did not predict the use of negative frames. 
The “Asian” social identifier was also insignificant; it was used only 26 times 
prior to 9/11 and was never used after 9/11. Insert Table 5.6
The significant increase in both the amount and level of negativity of 
immigration rhetoric is indicative of congressional attempts to expand the 
immigration policy image to include issues of terrorism and border security. 
There are 154 negative mentions of immigration by the elected officials in 
the hearings we coded. In their official testimony and responses in the con-
gressional hearings, elected members of the Congress only used 43 negative 
frames about immigration prior to 9/11 (28% of the negative frames). After 
9/11, there were 111 negative frames used (72% of the negative frames). This 
is a 158 percent increase in negativity after 9/11. 
CONCLUSION
This chapter demonstrates that the authoritarian shift in public opinion, news 
coverage of immigration and presidential rhetoric, as discussed in previous 
chapters, also occurred in congressional hearings. We used an exploratory 
study of Senate hearings pertaining to immigration to show how the shift 
transpired after 9/11 and the extent to which party identification played a 
role in maintaining and expanding the authoritarian approach to immigration 
policy. The policy image of immigration was expanded and maintained by 
the continued use of the negative immigration framing nexus. Our research 
suggests that 9/11 functioned as a shock to the immigration policy monopoly, 
expanding the authoritarian approach to immigration rhetoric to include ter-
rorism and border security in the anti-immigration framing nexus. 
These findings were based on a content analysis of 1,989 mentions of 
immigration in congressional hearings that took place over a ten-year period, 
1995–2015, crossing September 11, 2001. From our reading of these hearings 
and the expert testimony in them, we concluded that a competition for party 
ownership of the immigration issue transpired in the Congress; it also appears 
that both Democrats and Republicans were willing, in this time frame, to con-
nect immigration to border security without qualification. Significant events 
can garner the attention of the Congress and shape the image of topical policies 
such as immigration. The Congress and the experts, through their testimonies, 
have shaped the immigration narrative in a substantive manner, one that con-
tinues the negativity and authoritarian approach to how immigrants supposedly 
participate in civic life, creating a persistent immigrant threat narrative. This 
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dominant repertoire of immigration frames finds support from both parties and 
little competition from inclusive or anti-authoritarian immigration narratives.
NOTES
1. It is important to note here that party control of the Senate had already changed 
three times since January 3, 2001. Once when Vice President Al Gore was still the tie 
breaker as president of the Senate. Again, after George W. Bush and Vice President 
Dick Cheney are sworn in on January 20, 2001, giving the Republicans the majority 
and control of the committees. Again, in early June when the Republican senator of 
Vermont, Jim Jeffords, switched from Republican to Independent and said he would 
caucus with the Democrats in the Senate, giving the Democrats control. Lastly, the 
Democrats knew that their majority position in the Senate would be short-lived, as 
a special election in Missouri was underway for the seat of Mel Carnahan who died 
prior to winning his election. Even though the Senate would choose not to reorganize 
after the election results on November 25 until the new session convened in January, 
Democrats knew that they were going to lose their chairmanships to the Republicans 
and their new majority.
2. We ran separate regressions with the same variables in the model presented 
above, changing only the dependent variable, each time, to a dichotomous variable of 
the type of negative frame, illegality, criminality, terrorism, and economic threat. We 
did this to see if holding all other variables constant, the expert testimony of each of 
the groups also increased their likelihood of using each of the frames after 9/11. When 
the frames are differentiated from just any frame, the directions of the coefficients 
were correct and significant for the “criminality” frame; non-elected bureaucrats and 
interest groups are significantly more likely to use the “criminality” frame after 9/11.
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